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banking






                                                                            • banking crisis  Arun Jaitley says the RBI had
                                                                            failed to stop lending spree during UPA rule

                                                                            pressures or even a full-blown crisis
                                                                            that eventually require sharper mon-
                                                                            etary contractions; excessive lowering
                                                                            of interest rates or relaxation in bank
                                                                            capital and liquidity requirements can
                                                                            lead to greater credit creation, asset-
                                                                            price inflation, and semblance of strong
                                                                            economic growth in the short term, but
                                                                            excessive credit growth is usually ac-
                                                                            companied by lending down the quality
                                                                            curve which triggers mal-investment,
                                                                            asset- price crashes, and financial crises
                                                                            in the long term.
                                                                              Sweeping bank loan losses under
                                                                            the rug by compromising supervisory
                                                                            and regulatory standards can create a
                                                                            façade of financial stability in the short


                                                                             The Reserve Bank
                                                                             of India is not
                                                                             directly subject
                                                                             to political time
                                                                             pressures and the
           acquires urgency; where manifestos   over business and financial cycles, and   induced neglect
           cannot be delivered upon, populist al-  hence, have to peer into the medium
           ternatives need to be arranged with   to long term. Unsurprisingly, central   of the future; by
           immediacy.                      banks strive to build credibility through   virtue of being
             In contrast, a central bank plays a   a series of difficult choices that reflect
           Test match, trying to win each session   sacrificing short-term gains for long-  nominated rather
           but importantly also survive it so as to   term outcomes such as price or finan-  than elected
           have a chance to win the next session,   cial stability.
           and so on. In particular, the central   Another explanation as to why the
           bank is not directly subject to political   central bank is separate from the gov-
           time pressures and the induced neglect   ernment relates to the observation that   run, but inevitably cause the fragile
           of the future; by virtue of being nomi-  much of what the central bank man-  deck of cards to fall in a heap at some
           nated rather than elected, central bank-  ages or influences — money creation,   point in future, likely with a greater tax-
           ers have horizons of decision- making   credit creation, external sector man-  payer bill and loss of potential output.
           that tend to be longer than that of gov-  agement, and financial stability — in-  While not always the case, often
           ernments, spanning election cycles or   volves potential front-loaded benefits   the required interventions for stable
           war periods. While they clearly have to   to the economy but with the possibil-  growth are structural reforms by the
           factor in the immediate consequences   ity of attendant “tail risk” in the form   government with upfront fiscal outlay;
           of their policy decisions, central bank-  of back-loaded costs from financial ex-  however, these may compromise popu-
           ers can afford to take a pause, reflect,   cess or instability. For example, greater   list expenditures or require displeasing
           and ask the question as to what would   supply of money can facilitate ease of   incumbents. As a result, it might seem
           be the long-term consequences of   financial transactions, including the fi-  as an expedient solution to the govern-
           their, as well as government’s, policies.   nancing of government deficits, but this   ment to ask/task/mandate/direct the
           Indeed, by their mandate central banks   can cause economy to over-heat in due   central bank to pursue strategies that
           are committed to stabilise the economy   course and trigger (hyper-) inflationary   generate short-term gains but effec-



                                        Tehelka / 15 november 2018  43  www.Tehelka.com



     41-45 RBI.indd   3                                                                                02/11/18   11:33 AM
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