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• Freedom first  RBI chief Urjit Patel and his deputy Dr Viral V Acharya are batting for independence of the regulatory institution

            tively create tail risks for the economy.   working by blocking or opposing   its efficiency and expertise over time.
            To protect the economy from such   rule-based central banking policies,   When important parts of financial in-
            short-termism, the central bank is de-  and favoring instead discretionary   termediation are kept outside the pur-
            signed to be at a safe distance from the   or joint decision-making with direct   view of the central bank, systemic risks
            executive branch of the government.  government interventions; and by set-  can build up in “shadow banking” with
                                            ting up parallel regulatory agencies   private gains in good times to a small
            Influencing RBI working         with weaker statutory powers and/or   set of players but at substantive costs to
            Now, although the central bank is for-  encouraging development of unregu-  future generations in the form of un-
            mally organised to be separate from   lated entities that perform financial   checked financial fragility.
            the government, its effective horizon   intermediation functions outside the
            of decision-making can be reduced for   purview of the central bank.  Accountable to people
            short-term gains by the government,   There are several reasons why   The central bank can of course make
            if it so desires, through a variety of   enshrining and maintaining central   mistakes, and is generally held public-
            mechanisms, like appointing govern-  bank independence ends up being an   ly accountable through parliamentary
            ment officials rather than technocrats   inclusive reform for the economy; and   scrutiny and transparency norms. This
            to key central bank positions, such as   conversely, undermining such inde-  way, the institutional arrangement
            Governor, and more generally, senior   pendence a regressive, extractive one.  of independence, transparency and
            management. Another way is pursu-  When governance of the central   accountability to the public not only
            ing steady attrition and erosion of   bank is undermined, it is unlikely to   balance but also strengthen the cen-
            statutory powers of the central bank   attract or be able to retain the bright-  tral bank’s autonomy. However, direct
            through piece-meal legislative amend-  est minds that thrive on the ability to   intervention and interference by the
            ments that directly or indirectly eat at   debate freely, think independently,   government in operational mandate of
            separation of the central bank from   and effect change; attrition of central   the central bank negate its functional
            the government.                 bank powers results in attrition of its   autonomy.
              The government can control its   human capital and deterioration of   Macroeconomic management can



                                        tehelka / 15 november 2018  44  www.tehelka.com



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