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BANKING



 What went wrong with IL&FS?                                             structure Development Finance Corpo-


                                                                         rations were created so as to cater for
                                                                         long-gestation projects and for refinanc-
                                                                         ing bank loans to infra projects. Slowly,
 The chartered accountants’ apex body has sought an explanation from firms that carried out statutory   however, all these institutions were at-
 audit of crisis-hit IL&FS group during the past few years amid concerns about liquidity crunch    tracted by the idea of ‘universal banking’,
                                                                         and eventually all of them transformed
 in the financial system, writes BHARAT HITESHI                          into commercial banks.
                                                                           The irony is, IL&FS seems to have en-
 he  government  has  seized   infancy.  Its original stakeholders were   reduced the travel time between Jammu   tered and encountered serious problems
 control of the IL&FS board   UTI, HDFC and the Central Bank of India.  and Srinagar by a spectacular two hours.  as an infrastructure financier for many
 recently. As situation turns   IL&FS has institutional sharehold-  In the process, the IL&FS group grew   years, it could not but have been acutely
 murky, the Institute of Char-  ers including SBI, LIC, ORIX Corpora-  into a true behemoth, formidable but also   aware of the many serious problems
 T tered Accountants of India   tion of Japan and Abu Dhabi Investment   unwieldy and extremely complicated in   the whole infra sector is laden with. In-
 (ICAI) said it has issued notices to audit   Authority (ADIA). As on March 31, 2018,   its architecture, comprising over 200   credibly, however, it plunged headlong
 firms that conducted statutory audit   LIC and ORIX Corporation are the larg-  business units/arms each of which drew   into the turbulence itself, daring it do its
 works of IL&FS group in the past few   est shareholders in IL&FS with their   sustenance from the parent/holding   worst, as it were. It is here that the com-
 years. The institute, however, has not   stakeholding at 25.34 per cent and 23.54   company (IL&FS Ltd) but did not easily   pany’s board comes into sharp focus. It is
 disclosed the specific details. In the re-  per cent, respectively. Other prominent   lend itself to a close examination. Only   always the board’s brief to direct policy
 cent past, there have been news reports   shareholders include ADIA (12.56 per   three of IL&FS’ subsidiaries are listed   as well as to oversee the implementation
 regarding diversion of loan money in   cent), HDFC (9.02 per cent), CBI (7.67 per   companies — none of the SPVs is a listed   of agreed policy.
 IL&FS and its subsidiary companies, the   cent) and SBI (6.42 per cent).  entity — and the intermeshing of their   The defaults also jeopardised hundreds   nificantly, because bank loans are bench-  It is completely unbelievable that a
 ICAI said in a statement. “The Discipli-  It was a government-sponsored en-  financials makes the group quite opaque   of investors, banks and mutual funds as-  marked to some underlying which may   board packed supposedly with some
 nary Directorate of the ICAI, upon com-  terprise in the private sector. Over the   to any meaningful scrutiny.  sociated with IL&FS.  change dramatically in course of the pro-  of the best and brightest in brains (R.C.
 ing across such news report has suo   decades, the company reinvented itself   The holding company managed to   The defaults sparked panic among eq-  ject’s implementation and debt servicing.  Bhargava, Michael Pinto, Jaithirth Rao,
 motu taken cognizance of the matter and  in every which way imaginable. The   show itself in good light even as the   uity investors even as several non-bank-  The financing of infrastructure is of-  S.B. Mathur, Rina Kamath) failed so out-
 pro-actively issued notices to the statuto-  company had also outgrown its original   group as a whole had been sinking under   ing financial companies faced turmoil   ten plagued by all these risks, because if   rageously in its basic duties. The board
 ry auditors on October 4, 2018 for the rel-  mission, mutating into a major infra-  the dead weight of unfinished projects   amid a default scare. During 2017-18, the   the project cash flows are low or delayed,  had nominees of SBI, LIC and CBI as
 evant years of the concerned company   structure player itself, no longer content  and dramatically rising liabilities. Over   net group loss was  21 billion while, in the  debt servicing cannot help being tardy   well and it is inconceivable how these
 seeking their explanation in the matter,”   with financing of infrastructure alone.    the three years from 2014-15 to 2017-18,   same year, short-term debt alone went   or erratic. But even more importantly,   institutional directors merely looked
 it said. The institute has also written to   “From concept to execution” became its   consolidated debt rose 44% to nearly $13   up by  136 billion. The holding company’s  there is a fundamental flaw in funding   askance while the senior management
 the Reserve Bank of India and the Seri-  byword and the focus shifted from spon-  billion and the debt-to-net worth ratio   market standing was leveraged by every   of infrastructure because the lion’s share  dictated terms. Indeed, the board was so
 ous Fraud Investigation Office seeking   soring a project to facilitating, even actu-  climbed to a staggering 13:1. Analysts   subsidiary and each SPV to raise more   of the financing is accounted for by com-  self-indulgent that its risk management
 details about IL&FS issue.  ally implementing it. Its operating model  have indeed shown that even these num-  and resources at a steady clip.  mercial banks. Now, project loans are   committee never thought it necessary to
 was also a giddy amalgam of subsidiaries,  bers may be off the mark, that the group’s   As we know the infrastructure financ-  typically long-duration exposures, while   meet after July 2015.
 Genesis  associates and special purpose vehicles   net worth may have completely eroded if   ing is a tough enough job at the best of   an Indian bank’s corpus of funds has an
 The Infrastructure Leasing & Finance   (SPVs) many of which were set up around  we factor in all the intangible assets and   times and when it is coupled with dirty-  average maturity of no more than three   Is there road to revival?
 Services, is a core investment company   a specific project, such as a road, a bridge  the quasi-equity funds that have been   ing one’s own hands by actually execut-  years today. This mismatch between   The impasse at IL&FS is unlikely to be re-
 and serves as the holding company of   or the celebrated Chenani-Nashri High-  generously treated on par with equity in   ing infrastructure projects, the problems  the sources and the utilisations of bank   solved soon, or with just about minimal
 the IL&FS Group, with most business   way Tunnel, the country’s longest (9.3)   the group’s balance sheet.  could only multiply manifold.  funds is fraught with serious liquidity   loss to the stakeholders. The Mumbai-
 operations domiciled in separate com-  road tunnel on NH 44 in J&K which has   All infrastructure projects typically   risks.  And delinquencies in infra loans   headquartered company has identified
 panies which form an ecosystem of ex-  Why of crisis?  come loaded with a generous basket   have been the single most important   at least 25 projects for sale, which include
 pertise across infrastructure, finance   The IL&FS Financial Services, a group   of risks that most other business ven-  cause of bank NPAs in recent years.  some road and power projects. It is learnt
 and social and environmental services.   There is a   company, defaulted in payment obliga-  tures manage to steer clear of: long and   Till the 1980s, India had what were   that the company has already received
 The IL&FS IL&FS’s mandate was to fi-  fundamental   tions of bank loans (including interest),   protracted  implementation;  natural   then called ‘Development Financial In-  firm offers for 14 projects. The govern-
 nance the building and maintenance of   term and short-term deposits and failed   calamities or some other unforeseen   stitutions’ — like the IDBI, the ICICI or the  ment has moved National Company Law
 infrastructure projects that were meant   flaw in funding   to meet the commercial paper redemp-  contingencies; delayed for regulatory ap-  IFCI — that had been set up primarily as   Tribunal (NCLT) today to supersede the
 to be commercially viable in the long run   tion obligations due on September 14. On   provals; escalation of costs well beyond   vehicles of project funding. Traditionally,  IL&FS board and change the company
 like toll roads, ports, power generation   of infrastructure   September 15, the company reported that   the original estimates and the need for   the commercial banks were engaged in   management. A rescue-plan by the Cen-
 and/or distribution facilities and so on.   because the lion’s   it had received notices for delays and   mobilizing and servicing of additional   financing short-term (mainly working   tre is urgently needed. It has already pro-
 At its inception in 1987 as a ‘core invest-  defaults in servicing some of the inter   debt; inadequate, or at any rate slow rev-  capital) needs while the resources of   posed to appoint 10 nominee directors
 ment company’ registered with the RBI,   share of the financing   corporate deposits accepted by it. Con-  enue/cash generation; and finally, often   these DFIs were harnessed for longer-  who will report to the NCLT for relevant
 it could look mainly at private sector   is accounted for by   sequent to defaults, rating agency ICRA   a change in the business environment   term loans. Equity, long-term deposits   plans for the road ahead.
 ventures, because the public-private-  downgraded the ratings of its short-term   that nobody ever anticipated.  Naturally,   and debentures funded these institu-
 partnership (PPP) model was still in its   commercial banks  and long-term borrowing prograramme.   the servicing cost of a bank loan rise sig-  tions. Later, corporations like the Infra-  LETTERS@TEHELKA.COM



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