A file photo of Dinesh Trivedi
By Jayanta Ghosal
What will be Dinesh Trivedi’s role as India’s High Commissioner to Dhaka? Why did the central government led by Narendra Modi announce his name for such an important diplomatic post just before the West Bengal Legislative Assembly election? Let us try to understand this decision.
To understand it, one must consider a few basic points.
First, this is clearly a political appointment. Perhaps for the first time, India’s High Commissioner to Bangladesh comes from a political background rather than being a career diplomat. Traditionally, from J. N. Dixit to Harsh Vardhan Shringla, and from Dev Mukherjee to Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, all High Commissioners in Dhaka have been officers of the Indian Foreign Service (IFS). Trivedi breaks this tradition.
Second, Dinesh Trivedi is not Bengali by birth; he is Gujarati, though he grew up in Kolkata. He speaks fluent Bengali and has a multifaceted personality. His political career has been long and varied. He was earlier associated with the All India Trinamool Congress, and Mamata Banerjee had made him Railway Minister. Later, due to differences, he resigned and joined the Bharatiya Janata Party. After joining the BJP, he was not renominated to the Rajya Sabha, but the Prime Minister chose him for the sensitive post of High Commissioner to Bangladesh.
Third, some political analysts have linked this appointment to electoral strategy, especially in areas like Bhabanipur where there is a significant Gujarati population. However, this explanation does not fully capture the core reason behind the decision.
So what is the real reason?
The main reason lies in Trivedi’s relatively neutral image in Bangladesh’s internal politics. Many Bengali leaders, diplomats, and journalists have historically been seen as close to Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League. Similarly, many Congress leaders have had emotional and historical ties with Bangladesh dating back to the Bangladesh Liberation War. Trivedi, however, carries no such “baggage”.
The situation in Bangladesh has changed significantly. After Sheikh Hasina stepped down from power, she took refuge in Delhi. Elections followed, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party came to power, with Tarique Rahman (son of Khaleda Zia) becoming Prime Minister. In this altered political landscape, India’s policy has also adapted. India does not want confrontation with the new government; rather, it seeks stable and friendly relations.
The key driver behind this is geopolitics. Bangladesh is strategically very important. Amid shifting global power balances, tensions involving the US, Iran, and Israel, and emerging alliances, India must carefully maintain equilibrium. There are trade-related frictions with the US, while Iran remains crucial due to oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz.
At the same time, the China–Russia axis is strengthening, and China has expanded its influence in Bangladesh. Pakistan is also trying to reassert its presence in the region. India does not want Bangladesh to drift into the orbit of China or Pakistan. Although Tarique could have leaned towards them, he has instead signalled a willingness to improve ties with India.
Despite political changes, Bangladesh remains significantly dependent on India, and India too wants to sustain this relationship. Trade continues, power supply agreements are ongoing, and Bangladesh has begun clearing dues to Indian companies on time. The BNP is projecting itself as a pro-business party.
In this context, Trivedi’s appointment appears strategically sound. He is seen as a non-controversial and neutral figure, not perceived as being close to the Awami League—something that works in favour of the BNP.
He also brings certain strengths. He is considered close to the Prime Minister and Amit Shah. His knowledge of Gujarati allows him to communicate directly with the top leadership in Delhi, potentially speeding up decision-making.
He has also had a working relationship with Mamata Banerjee. On several Bangladesh-related issues—such as water-sharing—the consent of the West Bengal government is essential. This makes his equation with her particularly important. He can act as a bridge between Kolkata and Delhi.
For instance, the Ganga water-sharing agreement is due to expire this year. Bangladesh wants it extended for 30 years, while India is proposing 15 years. This is a sensitive matter requiring political negotiation. No agreement is possible without West Bengal’s consent.
In such situations, Trivedi’s political background may help him navigate complex issues. Mamata Banerjee has previously remarked that political representatives can sometimes arrive at better solutions than bureaucrats.
Additionally, cultural and people-to-people engagements—language, literature, music, book fairs, and visa arrangements—are important. A large number of Bangladeshis also travel to India for medical treatment. Trivedi could play a key role in these areas as well.
In this way, he can become a crucial link between New Delhi, Dhaka, and Kolkata.
Finally, it is also worth noting that India is now maintaining limited engagement even with organisations like the Jamaat-e-Islami. This does not indicate ideological support but reflects a pragmatic strategy. Earlier, during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, India relied heavily on one side; that approach is now being reconsidered.
In the present scenario, India’s priority is clear—despite uncertainties surrounding Tarique’s leadership, it is essential to maintain stable and constructive relations with Bangladesh. Within this broader strategy, Dinesh Trivedi’s role is being seen as both important and balanced.
