Why BJP believes power in J&K remains within its reach

Despite the National Conference-led government's comfortable majority, the BJP believes changing political equations and its influence at the Centre could eventually open a path to power in J&K

BJP National President Nitin Nabin

By Riyaz Wani
BJP national president Nitin Nabin’s declaration during his July 6–7 visit to Kashmir that “the day is not far when Jammu and Kashmir will have a BJP government” was more than routine political optimism. It reflected the party’s long-term strategy in the Union Territory where, despite sitting in the opposition, it continues to wield considerable influence through its dominance at the Centre and its position as the second-largest party in the Assembly.
At first glance, the numbers do not favour the BJP. The National Conference (NC), which emerged as the single largest party in last year’s Assembly elections with 42 seats, enjoys a comfortable majority with the support of its ally, the Congress, which won six seats. Together with the CPI(M) legislator and supporting independents, the ruling alliance commands 49 seats in the 90-member Assembly—well above the halfway mark of 46.

The BJP, on the other hand, has 29 MLAs, all but one from the Jammu division. It is the single largest opposition party but remains well short of the numbers required to form a government on its own.

Yet Nabin’s confidence is not entirely without political logic.

Unlike in many states, power in Jammu and Kashmir is not determined solely by Assembly arithmetic. Since the erstwhile state was reorganised into a Union Territory in 2019, the elected government functions within a framework where significant executive authority rests with the Lieutenant Governor, who represents the Union government. That institutional arrangement gives the BJP influence over governance even while it remains outside the elected administration.

The NC government has therefore adopted a pragmatic approach. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has consciously prioritised the restoration of statehood over more contentious political demands and has repeatedly stressed the need for a cooperative relationship with New Delhi. His government understands that confrontation with the Centre could further constrain an administration whose powers are already limited under the Union Territory arrangement.

For now, the coalition appears politically secure. There are no visible signs of instability within the NC-Congress alliance, and the BJP lacks enough allies to mount a credible challenge. The Assembly verdict also reflected a clear regional mandate: Kashmir overwhelmingly backed the NC-led alliance while the Hindu-majority areas of Jammu consolidated behind the BJP.

However, politics in Jammu and Kashmir has rarely been static.

The BJP’s statement appears to acknowledge that electoral victory may not be the only route to power. If political circumstances change—whether because of internal divisions within the NC, defections or shifting alliances—the party could attempt to build an alternative majority. Such political realignments are not unprecedented in Indian politics, and anti-defection laws, while imposing significant legal constraints, have not entirely prevented governments from changing through splits and mergers.

The NC today appears united under Omar Abdullah’s leadership, but managing a diverse coalition over a full term is never straightforward. Governance challenges, unmet public expectations and differences within the alliance could create political vulnerabilities. The BJP, with its sizeable legislative presence and organisational strength, is likely to remain alert to any such opening.

The party’s calculations are also shaped by the fact that it has achieved a historic consolidation in Jammu. Its tally of 29 seats represents its strongest-ever Assembly performance in the region and has cemented it as the dominant political force there. Expanding its footprint into the Kashmir Valley remains difficult, but even modest gains in future elections could substantially alter the political balance.

Meanwhile, the NC government faces an equally difficult balancing act. It must deliver on governance while pursuing statehood restoration, all within a constitutional framework that limits its authority. Any inability to fulfil electoral promises risks giving the BJP an opportunity to argue that the present dispensation has failed.

For the BJP, remaining in opposition does not necessarily mean political irrelevance. It can use the Assembly to hold the government accountable while simultaneously leveraging its influence at the Centre. That dual position enables it to shape political discourse even without occupying the treasury benches.

Nabin’s assertion should therefore be seen less as an immediate prediction than as a statement of political intent. The NC-led coalition is numerically stable and faces no imminent threat to its majority. But in Jammu and Kashmir’s fluid political landscape, where constitutional arrangements, regional divides and alliance politics intersect, governments are often judged not only by the numbers they command but also by their ability to hold those numbers together.

For the moment, Omar Abdullah’s government appears safe. But the BJP’s message is clear: it considers its current role in opposition temporary and believes that, should the political equations shift, it is prepared to seize the opportunity to govern Jammu and Kashmir.