Have you ever watched Rabri being prepared?
Making Rabri is a slow and carefully balanced process. The milk is continuously heated from below, allowing it to thicken gradually. At the same time, the surface is cooled by a fan or a steady flow of air so that layers of cream, or malai, can form. The heat below and the cooling above work together simultaneously. The water content slowly evaporates, the milk thickens, and the desired texture is achieved.
This delicate balance between heat and cooling is what I describe as the “Rabri process.” It is a useful metaphor for understanding Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s current diplomatic strategy towards Bangladesh.
Following the political transition in Bangladesh after Sheikh Hasina left office, Muhammad Yunus assumed leadership. During the following year, Bangladesh witnessed a sustained public campaign that many in India viewed as increasingly anti-Indian, accompanied by stronger pro-China rhetoric. There were also statements suggesting closer strategic cooperation with Pakistan, including remarks that raised concerns in India about Bangladesh’s future security posture.
Subsequently, Yunus stepped aside, and Bangladesh moved towards elections, a development that India itself had consistently supported. After the transition, Tarique Rahman emerged as prime minister.
The question today is, where exactly do India-Bangladesh relations stand?
The issue became even more sensitive after Sheikh Hasina addressed a virtual press conference organised by the Foreign Correspondents’ Club. Following her remarks, Bangladesh’s Foreign Ministry reacted strongly, arguing that the speech could negatively affect bilateral relations.
Dhaka maintained that it wanted constructive relations with India but also suggested that the episode raised questions about India’s intentions.
Against this backdrop, an important question emerges: What exactly does Narendra Modi want?
Is his objective to rebuild peace with Bangladesh through dialogue and negotiations? Or is India preparing for a more confrontational relationship?
The answer appears to lie somewhere in between.
On one hand, Narendra Modi appointed his close BJP colleague Dinesh Trivedi, a Gujarati leader who is also fluent in Bengali, assigning him Cabinet status and entrusting him with an important diplomatic role relating to Bangladesh.
Since assuming that responsibility, Dinesh Trivedi has worked actively to improve relations with the government of Prime Minister Tarique. As part of his assignment, he has met Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister and is expected to meet the Prime Minister himself shortly. He has also held discussions with senior advisers to the Prime Minister, including M. Humayun Kabir, along with a wide range of political, diplomatic, and cultural stakeholders.
His outreach has not been limited to political circles. He has consistently promoted Bengali culture and emphasised communal harmony and cooperation among people of all religions.
While these diplomatic efforts are underway, another development is unfolding simultaneously.
The Bangladesh government believes that Sheikh Hasina’s continued international visibility has, directly or indirectly, benefited from India’s support. There are reports that India could facilitate her proposed visit to Dhaka in December by extending the necessary diplomatic assistance. These reports have naturally attracted considerable attention within Bangladesh.
At the same time, preparations are also underway for the upcoming BIMSTEC Summit, over which India currently holds the chairmanship.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has invited Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique to attend the summit, and Dhaka has indicated that he is likely to participate.
Although the BIMSTEC meeting would technically be a multilateral engagement rather than a bilateral state visit, discussions are also reportedly taking place to explore whether Tarique could undertake an official bilateral visit to India before the summit. The Indian government is actively pursuing that possibility through diplomatic channels in Dhaka.
However, these positive diplomatic initiatives are accompanied by significant strategic concerns.
India remains suspicious of Tarique’s recent visit to China. From New Delhi’s perspective, the timing of the visit was particularly significant because it came before any official visit to India.
Bangladesh has argued that Tarique travelled to Malaysia before visiting China and therefore did not go directly to Beijing. India, however, does not consider that explanation particularly convincing.
New Delhi is also closely watching the growing strategic engagement between Bangladesh and China.
Another source of concern is the recent visit of Pakistan’s ISI chief to Bangladesh and reports of increasing coordination between the Pakistani and Bangladeshi militaries.
These developments have not been viewed favourably by India.
Nor is India alone in its concerns. The United States is also believed to be watching Bangladesh’s growing engagement with China with considerable caution.
Against this backdrop, Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister travelled to Washington for discussions with the US administration. Around the same time, the senior US Special Envoy, Sergio Gor, responsible for the region, also visited Bangladesh for consultations.
Given the current strategic rivalry between the United States and China, Bangladesh’s geopolitical importance has increased substantially. As a result, the country has become the focus of an emerging geopolitical tug-of-war among major powers.
Within this context, India has several possible diplomatic options.
One possibility would be to adopt a more assertive approach by facilitating Sheikh Hasina’s return to Bangladesh in December.
If that were to happen, an immediate question would arise: how would the Bangladesh government respond?
Would it attempt to arrest her upon arrival at the airport?
Such a move could trigger widespread public unrest, particularly if sympathy for Sheikh Hasina continues to grow within Bangladesh.
Ironically, many believe that the Bangladesh government does not necessarily want Sheikh Hasina back in active politics. Rather, it would prefer a silent Sheikh Hasina—someone who remains politically inactive and refrains from making public statements.
Her continued speeches and interviews have therefore become a source of irritation for the authorities in Dhaka.
Even Taslima Nasreen’s recent visit to Kolkata and her public support for Sheikh Hasina have been viewed in Bangladesh as part of a broader political design.
India, however, presents a different argument.
According to New Delhi, the Bangladesh government is increasingly compromising with militant and Islamist forces, particularly Jamaat, largely out of political necessity. India believes Tarique feels compelled to accommodate these forces.
There has also been speculation within sections of the Bangladeshi media regarding UNESCO’s renewed engagement with Bangladesh, including reports suggesting that a future UNESCO presidential event could be hosted there.
Taken together, these developments have reinforced India’s belief that Bangladesh itself must first determine its long-term strategic orientation.
If the country continues moving towards what many describe as greater Talibanisation or Jamaatisation, the consequences would not only concern India but also affect broader regional stability. Such a development would be undesirable for both India and the United States.
Another issue complicating the relationship is the possibility that Sheikh Hasina could return to Bangladesh with India’s assistance. Some media reports have even speculated that such a development could create fresh political instability or, in an extreme scenario, trigger renewed civil unrest.
Bangladesh is already facing significant economic challenges. Employment opportunities remain limited, growth has slowed, and economic uncertainty continues to affect the country.
Despite these tensions, Dhaka has proposed fresh negotiations with New Delhi on the long-pending Teesta water-sharing agreement.
Bangladesh has also requested discussions on renewing the Ganges Water Sharing Agreement, which is due for renewal, and formally approached India on 8 June regarding the matter.
So far, however, New Delhi has not issued any formal response to Bangladesh’s proposal.
Against this backdrop, Dinesh Trivedi, representing the Indian High Commission, has argued that if both sides can resume structured negotiations—and if Prime Minister Tarique visits India—there remains an opportunity to restart the peace process and significantly improve bilateral relations.
This is precisely where the “Rabri process” carries its greatest risk.
The danger is that the relationship could eventually reach a point of no return, where diplomatic management gives way to open confrontation.
The essence of the Rabri process lies in managing two seemingly contradictory approaches simultaneously—taking one step forward while occasionally stepping two steps back. Such a strategy demands extraordinary coordination, careful judgement, and political maturity.
For this approach to succeed, India requires a completely unified chain of command in handling Bangladesh policy. Any lack of coordination within the system could undermine the entire strategy.
At the same time, Narendra Modi and Amit Shah must also consider the BJP’s domestic political priorities.
The BJP continues to campaign aggressively against Islamic fundamentalism. Issues such as illegal Bangladeshi infiltration, border security, cross-border firing, and concerns regarding Jamaat remain central to the party’s political narrative.
If the BJP were to soften its hardline Hindutva position or dilute its politics of polarisation, it could weaken support among its own core constituency.
Consequently, while India pursues diplomatic engagement with Bangladesh, the BJP must simultaneously maintain a firm political stance—particularly on issues concerning Jamaat and cross-border security.
In West Bengal, Suvendu Adhikari, with the full backing of Union Home Minister Amit Shah, continues to pursue that political line.
The timing also matters. The Uttar Pradesh Assembly election is approaching rapidly. Punjab will also go to the polls, while elections to the Kolkata Municipal Corporation and several municipalities across West Bengal are also on the horizon.
Given these political realities, the BJP cannot afford to abandon its existing position on Bangladesh.
That is why India’s Bangladesh policy currently appears to rest on a carefully calibrated two-pronged strategy, maintaining diplomatic engagement and dialogue on one side while preserving political firmness and strategic pressure on the other.
The process requires constant balance between two opposing forces. Whether this delicate equilibrium can ultimately be maintained will determine the future direction of India-Bangladesh relations.
