Sonam Wangchuk and other Ladakh leaders after talks with central government officials.
By Riyaz Wani
The recent breakthrough in talks between the Centre and Ladakh’s leadership has triggered a significant political ripple across Jammu and Kashmir. After years of sustained agitation, negotiations, and public mobilisation, Ladakh’s civil society groups appear to have secured an in-principle agreement from New Delhi on constitutional safeguards modelled on Articles 371A, 371F and 371G, along with a framework for greater democratic representation and eventual statehood.
The development has not gone unnoticed in Kashmir. In fact, it has revived political demands that had been languishing in Jammu and Kashmir since the abrogation of Article 370 and the bifurcation of the erstwhile state in August 2019.
Today, almost every major political party in Jammu and Kashmir, except the BJP, is demanding restoration of statehood and renewed engagement with New Delhi. The ruling National Conference (NC), which governs J&K, has gone a step further by announcing protests in New Delhi during Parliament’s monsoon session to press for statehood and constitutional guarantees.
Yet there is an irony at the heart of this new political mobilisation. The demands now being amplified in Srinagar are, in many ways, echoes of a struggle that Ladakh began years ago.
Ladakh showed the way
When Ladakh became a Union Territory in 2019, many residents initially celebrated separation from Jammu and Kashmir. However, enthusiasm soon gave way to anxiety.
People in both Leh and Kargil realised that Union Territory status without constitutional protections could leave local land, jobs, culture and identity vulnerable. This led to the emergence of an unusual alliance between the Leh Apex Body (LAB) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA).
Despite ideological, religious and regional differences, the two groups united around a common agenda: constitutional safeguards, democratic representation, protection of local resources, and eventually statehood.
What distinguished the Ladakh movement was its consistency.
For years, its leaders pursued negotiations, protests, hunger strikes and public campaigns. Activists such as Sonam Wangchuk helped draw national attention to the issue. Even when talks stalled and tensions escalated, the movement maintained focus on a clearly defined set of demands.
The result was that New Delhi eventually entered sustained negotiations. The recent agreement suggests that the Centre has accepted the principle of granting constitutional protections similar to those enjoyed by states such as Nagaland, Sikkim and Mizoram.
Whether the final arrangement fully satisfies Ladakh’s aspirations remains to be seen. But politically, Ladakh achieved something important: it compelled the Centre to negotiate.
Kashmir’s delayed response
The success of Ladakh’s campaign has now become a reference point for political parties in Jammu and Kashmir.
Former chief minister Mehbooba Mufti openly acknowledged this in her recent outreach to political parties. In letters addressed to Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and other leaders, she argued that Ladakh’s engagement with New Delhi offers an important lesson.
“The recent breakthroughs achieved by the Leh Apex Body and the Kargil Democratic Alliance in their engagement with the Govt of India offer an important lesson: sincere dialogue can lead to meaningful outcomes.”
She further urged political parties to unite, declaring: “If Ladakh could do it, so can we.”
Those words reflect a growing recognition within J&K’s political class that Ladakh has achieved something that Kashmir’s parties have struggled to do since 2019: build a broad, sustained and relatively united movement around constitutional and political rights.
J&K CM Omar Abdullah discussed the statehood issue with PM Modi on June 11.
For years after the abrogation of Article 370, political parties in J&K remained divided by electoral rivalries, leadership disputes and competing strategies. The People’s Alliance for Gupkar Declaration (PAGD), once projected as a common platform, gradually lost momentum.
Now, however, Ladakh’s progress has forced a reassessment.
National Conference takes the lead
The most notable shift has come from the ruling National Conference. Traditionally, governing parties tend to avoid street-level agitation. Yet the NC has announced a protest in New Delhi on the opening day of Parliament’s monsoon session to demand restoration of statehood and constitutional guarantees.
This is politically significant.
The NC already governs Jammu and Kashmir, albeit within the constraints of Union Territory status. By choosing protest politics, the party is effectively signalling that normal institutional channels have not yielded the desired results.
The move also reflects growing frustration within the party over the slow pace of statehood restoration despite repeated assurances from the Centre and favourable observations from the Supreme Court.
The NC’s position is straightforward: delimitation has been completed, elections have been held, and therefore the promise of restoring statehood should now be fulfilled.
Yet critics argue that the party is arriving late to a struggle that Ladakh initiated years ago.
Even within the NC, there is acknowledgement that a more sustained movement may be required. Srinagar MP Aga Syed Ruhullah Mehdi recently remarked: “The condition is that there should be sustainability and consistency. If there is no consistency, then there will be theatrics.”
Referring to Ladakh, he added that Kashmir’s political leadership should learn how to fight unitedly for rights.
His comments highlight an uncomfortable reality: while Ladakh maintained pressure through years of mobilisation, J&K’s political parties often remained trapped in cycles of electoral competition and mutual distrust.
Why the Centre Responded Differently to Ladakh
The key question now is whether New Delhi will respond to Jammu and Kashmir’s demands in the same way it responded to Ladakh. The answer is far from certain. Ladakh’s case and Jammu and Kashmir’s case are fundamentally different.
Ladakh’s demands focused primarily on constitutional safeguards, local governance and identity protection. The movement largely operated within a framework that did not challenge the broader political architecture created after 2019.
Jammu and Kashmir, however, sits at the centre of a much larger political and ideological debate.
The BJP has invested enormous political capital in the abrogation of Article 370. The move remains one of the defining achievements of the party’s national political narrative. Any significant concession on J&K is therefore viewed through a much more complex political lens than concessions to Ladakh.
Security considerations further complicate matters. Many observers in New Delhi believe that the Union Territory arrangement gives the Centre greater administrative control over a sensitive region. As long as security remains a dominant concern, there is likely to be resistance within sections of the central establishment to restoring full statehood.
Recent commentary from policy circles increasingly suggests a “security first, statehood later” approach. Under this view, statehood is not ruled out but postponed until the Centre is satisfied with long-term stability. This makes J&K’s situation very different from Ladakh’s.
The politics of constitutional safeguards
Another factor is symbolism. The constitutional safeguards being discussed for Ladakh resemble special protections that already exist in several Indian states. Because these provisions fit within an established constitutional framework, they are easier to accommodate politically.
In contrast, any discussion involving Jammu and Kashmir inevitably reopens debates surrounding Article 370, autonomy, federalism and the events of 2019.
That makes New Delhi far more cautious. Consequently, while Ladakh’s constitutional package may be moving forward, there is no guarantee that J&K’s demands will receive a similar response.
A new political reality
Nevertheless, the developments have altered the political landscape. For the first time in years, there appears to be a broad convergence among J&K’s political parties on at least one issue: statehood restoration.
The BJP remains the lone major exception, while parties across the spectrum—from the National Conference and PDP to Congress and others—are increasingly framing statehood as a democratic right rather than merely a political demand.
In that sense, Ladakh has reshaped the conversation. Its leaders demonstrated that sustained pressure, unity and engagement can prompt a response from the Centre. Kashmir’s political class is now trying to apply that lesson to its own circumstances.
Whether this effort succeeds is another matter. The NC’s planned protests in New Delhi represent a significant escalation, but they also underscore a larger truth: Jammu and Kashmir’s political parties are, in many ways, trying to catch up with a constitutional struggle that Ladakh began years earlier.
The challenge for them is that they are entering a race whose terrain is far more difficult. Ladakh sought safeguards and representation. Jammu and Kashmir seeks restoration of statehood in a region where the BJP has deep political, ideological and security stakes.
That distinction may ultimately determine why Ladakh’s demands found a receptive audience in New Delhi, and why J&K’s campaign may face a much longer road ahead.
