By Riyaz Wani
Recent remarks by the RSS leader Dattatreya Hosabale advocating that India should keep “a window for dialogue” open with Pakistan have reignited a familiar national debate: is New Delhi ready to once again engage Islamabad, or has the era of sustained dialogue effectively ended?
The comments, made around the first anniversary of the 2025 Pahalgam terror attack and India’s retaliatory Operation Sindoor, drew sharp criticism from sections of the Opposition, which accused the RSS leader of softening India’s stance on Pakistan at a time when bilateral ties remain deeply frozen. Yet Hosabale’s remarks also reflect a longer and more nuanced tradition within the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), one that combines hardline responses to terrorism with periodic calls for civil society engagement and people-to-people contact.
The renewed conversation comes at a time when India and Pakistan appear locked in what analysts describe as a “cold peace”: no full-scale war, but no meaningful diplomatic engagement either. Formal talks remain suspended, airspace restrictions continue, and political positions on Kashmir and terrorism have hardened further since the abrogation of Article 370 in J&K in 2019 and the subsequent escalation following the Pahalgam attack.
Hosabale argued that while Pakistan-sponsored attacks such as Pulwama required a strong response, India should not entirely shut the door on engagement.
“If the Pakistanis are trying to give pinpricks like in Pulwama etc., we have to answer wholesomely according to the situation because the security and self-respect of the nation has to be protected,” he said, while adding that diplomatic channels, trade, visas and civic interaction should continue as avenues for dialogue.
Hosabale also stressed the importance of engaging Pakistan’s civil society, arguing that scholars, sportspeople, scientists and community leaders could gradually influence public opinion inside Pakistan against militarism and hostility towards India.
The remarks immediately triggered criticism. Congress MP Manish Tewari questioned what had changed since the April 22, 2025 Pahalgam attack to justify reopening dialogue. Rajya Sabha MP Kapil Sibal described Hosabale’s reference to terror attacks as “pinpricks” as “obnoxious”.
However, some Kashmir-based leaders welcomed the statement. Farooq Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti reiterated that sustained dialogue remained the only realistic way to avoid perpetual hostility between two nuclear-armed neighbours.
RSS’s evolving position on Pakistan
While the controversy surrounding Hosabale’s remarks appears politically explosive, the RSS’s historical position on Pakistan has often been more layered than commonly perceived.
Over the decades, the Sangh has consistently advocated strong retaliation against terrorism while simultaneously arguing that civilisational and cultural ties between Indians and Pakistanis should not be entirely severed.
RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat has repeatedly spoken about South Asia’s shared civilisational heritage. In speeches delivered after Operation Sindoor in 2025, Bhagwat referred to neighbouring countries as “part of our own family” and argued that peace and prosperity in the region were in India’s broader strategic interest.
Earlier, during a lecture series in New Delhi in August 2025, Bhagwat described Akhand Bharat as a “truth” rooted in shared geography, culture and history. He argued that the peoples of the subcontinent remained linked despite political borders drawn after Partition.
Such statements are consistent with earlier RSS positions. Following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise Lahore visit in December 2015 to meet then Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Hosabale defended Modi’s outreach and argued that cordial relations with Pakistan aligned with India’s civilisational ethos of “vasudhaiva kutumbakam”.
Even during periods of heightened tensions, the RSS often attempted to maintain this dual approach, combining muscular nationalism with selective advocacy for engagement.
The long history of interrupted dialogue
India-Pakistan engagement since the late 1990s has followed a recurring pattern: diplomatic outreach interrupted by terrorist attacks or military confrontations.
Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee initiated the Composite Dialogue process with Pakistan in 1998, hoping to stabilise ties after both countries conducted nuclear tests. Vajpayee’s historic Lahore bus journey in February 1999 was intended to build trust and institutionalise peace.
Yet the optimism collapsed with the Kargil conflict later that year after Pakistani military intrusions into Kargil heights. The subsequent years saw further breakdowns following the IC-814 hijacking, the failed Agra summit and the 2001 Parliament attack.
Despite these crises, India repeatedly resumed engagement. Under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, bilateral ties expanded through the Composite Dialogue, back-channel negotiations on Kashmir and the Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism. Singh famously envisioned a future where people could travel freely across South Asia, describing a dream of having “breakfast in Kabul, lunch in Islamabad and dinner in Delhi”.
However, the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks derailed the process once again.
When Modi came to power in 2014, he initially attempted another diplomatic reset. He invited Sharif to his swearing-in ceremony and later visited Lahore in 2015. Yet the Pathankot and Uri attacks fundamentally altered India’s Pakistan policy.
Following Uri in 2016, India carried out surgical strikes across the Line of Control, establishing what officials described as a new doctrine of “kinetic deterrence”. The Pulwama attack in 2019 and the subsequent Balakot air strikes further reinforced the shift away from comprehensive dialogue.
Since then, New Delhi has adhered to the principle that “terror and talks cannot go together”.
Back-channel diplomacy continues quietly
Despite the public freeze in relations, confidential engagement between the two countries has not entirely stopped.
Since the May 2025 conflict and Operation Sindoor, India and Pakistan have reportedly participated in at least four Track 1.5 and Track 2 meetings in London, Muscat, Thailand and Doha. Facilitated by international think tanks and involving former diplomats, experts and political representatives, these discussions were aimed less at reconciliation and more at crisis management.
According to reports, the first meeting held in London shortly after Operation Sindoor was tense and confrontational, reflecting the heightened hostilities after the Pahalgam attack. Later meetings reportedly became more measured, suggesting that both sides recognise the risks of unchecked escalation.
Such back-channel engagements have historically played a critical role in India-Pakistan relations. During the Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh years, unofficial and semi-official channels often succeeded in maintaining communication even when formal diplomacy stalled.
Today, these discreet dialogues appear to serve primarily as strategic safety valves, allowing both countries to exchange messages without public political costs.
Kashmir, terrorism and the diplomatic deadlock
At the core of the current impasse lies a widening divergence over Kashmir and terrorism.
Since the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, India has increasingly framed Jammu and Kashmir as an internal constitutional matter beyond the scope of bilateral negotiations. Pakistan, meanwhile, insists that Kashmir must remain central to any future talks and has repeatedly called for restoration of Article 370 as a confidence-building measure.
This divergence has created an almost impossible starting point for formal engagement.
India maintains that Pakistan must dismantle terror infrastructure before talks can resume meaningfully. Pakistan argues that no lasting peace is possible without addressing Kashmir’s political future.
The continuing airspace bans imposed after the 2025 conflict symbolise this broader freeze. Although the restrictions have imposed economic and logistical costs, particularly on airlines forced to take longer international routes, both governments appear willing to bear those costs rather than risk appearing conciliatory.
The deeper strategic question confronting India is whether military retaliation alone is a viable resolution for the recurrent Indo-Pak antagonism.
India’s surgical strikes in 2016, Balakot strikes in 2019 and Operation Sindoor in 2025 demonstrated an increasing willingness to respond militarily to terror attacks. These operations carried significant domestic political symbolism and reinforced the government’s image of decisiveness.
Yet many analysts argue that while kinetic responses may temporarily restore deterrence or public confidence, they have not ended militancy.
The road ahead
For now, prospects for formal India-Pakistan dialogue remain bleak. Political rhetoric on both sides has hardened, diplomatic channels remain minimal and domestic political incentives discourage overt reconciliation.
Yet history suggests that even during the darkest phases of bilateral tensions, communication channels rarely disappear completely. From Vajpayee’s Lahore outreach to Singh’s back-channel negotiations and Modi’s surprise Pakistan visit, successive Indian governments have alternated between coercion and cautious engagement.
The RSS’s recent remarks indicate that this duality continues to shape sections of India’s strategic thinking.
Whether that translates into any meaningful thaw depends largely on developments inside India and Pakistan, and broader geopolitical pressures. For now, India and Pakistan remain caught between deterrence and dialogue, neither able to fully disengage nor willing to genuinely reconcile.
