The Bharatiya Janata Party appears to have entered election mode in Punjab. Its recent appointments are not merely routine organisational changes; taken together, they resemble the opening of a campaign command centre.
Kewal Singh Dhillon was appointed Punjab BJP president in May. Turbulence followed the reorganisation of district and state office-bearers, with a section of the old cadre feeling that entrants from other parties were being rewarded while long-serving workers were being pushed aside. The public resentment dented the new president’s early momentum.
Delhi has since responded with three significant moves. Manpreet Singh Badal has been elevated as national vice-president. Satish Poonia, an experienced organiser, has been appointed Punjab in-charge, filling the space left vacant after Vijay Rupani’s death. C.R. Paatil, Union Jal Shakti Minister, former Gujarat BJP president and a trusted political manager of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is reported to be the likely election in-charge. The appointment is yet to be officially announced, but the proposed deployment itself conveys the seriousness with which the BJP is approaching Punjab.
The arrangement combines a Jat Sikh state president, an experienced organiser to steady the cadre, a Punjab leader capable of speaking on economic issues and, possibly, a hard-driving election manager. It looks formidable. But multiple power centres can also create confusion unless their respective roles and authority are clearly defined.
The urgency follows the rise and fall of the BJP’s expectations. In the 2024 Lok Sabha election, the party secured 18.56 per cent of the vote—about 25 lakh votes—and led in 24 Assembly segments, its strongest statewide performance to date, yet won no parliamentary seat. At a rally in Moga in March 2026, Union Home Minister Amit Shah declared that wherever the BJP reaches 19 per cent, it forms the next government. For a cadre long confined to being the Shiromani Akali Dal’s junior partner, the claim was electrifying.
But rhetoric is not electoral arithmetic. Nineteen per cent is a foundation, not a bridge to 59 Assembly seats. Its value depends on how geographically and socially that support is distributed.
The 2024 figure came in a national election shaped by the Modi factor, with the BJP contesting all 13 Lok Sabha seats after its alliance with the SAD ended. Much of its support remained urban and semi-urban. An Assembly election is different. Candidates, community equations, rural networks and state-level leadership carry far greater weight. A parliamentary vote can be spread thinly across 117 constituencies without translating into Assembly victories.
This is why the recent People’s Pulse “Mood Punjab Da” survey should neither be dismissed nor treated as scripture. It estimates the AAP at 37 per cent and 58–63 seats; Congress at 31 per cent and 36–43 seats; Waris Punjab De at 14 per cent and 4–7 seats; BJP at 8 per cent and 2–6 seats; and SAD at 6 per cent and 2–4 seats.
People’s Pulse says it conducted 8,000 face-to-face interviews across all 117 constituencies between June 20 and July 31. I cannot independently verify its fieldwork, and one early survey is a snapshot, not a prophecy. Its figures are best read as a warning rather than a verdict.
The timing matters. The AAP’s advantage appears to rest substantially on its welfare architecture—what supporters describe as delivery and opponents as freebies. But the fieldwork ended before the August 7 mass mobilisation of employees and pensioners over the 18 per cent pending dearness allowance, the Old Pension Scheme and other demands. That growing pressure is therefore not reflected in the survey.
The leadership findings are equally revealing. Bhagwant Mann is the preferred chief minister at 40 per cent, followed by Charanjit Singh Channi at 33 per cent, Amritpal Singh at 13 per cent, Sukhbir Singh Badal at 5 per cent and Kewal Singh Dhillon at 4 per cent.
Congress has still not converted Channi’s popularity into a clear leadership proposition. I have argued for more than a year that his social and political weight would make him difficult to ignore. I wrote as far back as April 2025 about why Channi could no longer be ignored. That political forecast now appears vindicated. The survey reinforces that assessment.
For the BJP, however, the first challenge remains internal. Its Punjab unit now contains three distinct political cultures: the traditional urban cadre, former Congress leaders and leaders with roots in the Akali tradition. Expansion requires new faces, but growth cannot come at the cost of making the original cadre feel like tenants in its own house.
New leaders bring reach, resources and political networks; old workers bring loyalty and booth-level endurance. The differences must be ironed out if the party is to function as a coherent election machine.
Nor should Sunil Jakhar’s contribution be overlooked. Under his presidency, the BJP recorded its highest statewide vote share and led in 24 Assembly segments. He gave the party greater acceptability beyond its traditional cadre. Replacing him with Dhillon may reflect a new political calculation, but the BJP cannot afford to marginalise Jakhar or squander the ground gained under his leadership.
The larger challenge is understanding Punjab. It cannot be approached as just another state or as an extension of neighbouring Haryana. Punjab’s politics operates at three levels—economic, social and emotional—and emotion can often override arithmetic.
The economic issues are debt, unemployment, agrarian stagnation, weak investment and migration. The social concerns include drugs, gangsterism, law and order and an erosion of public confidence. The emotional layer arises from Punjab’s history, Sikh identity, federal grievances and a longstanding belief that Delhi does not always understand the state’s sacrifices and claims.
Any party that misses this third layer risks fundamentally misreading Punjab.
Manpreet Badal brings administrative experience, knowledge of public finance and familiarity with both Akali and Congress politics. He can frame an economic argument and provide a recognisable Sikh face at the national level. But his usefulness will depend on whether he is empowered to articulate a credible Punjab-specific economic and political programme.
Punjab faces more than conventional anti-incumbency. Law and order, drugs, unemployment, agricultural stagnation, industrial slowdown and mounting debt are converging into a structural crisis. Outstanding debt is projected to approach Rs 4.48 lakh crore by March 2027, or about 45 per cent of GSDP. Debt servicing consumes resources that could otherwise be deployed for infrastructure and employment, while manufacturing remains too weak to absorb Punjab’s young workforce.
Farmer anger, youth migration, drugs and gangsterism are not separate illnesses; they are symptoms of an economy that is increasingly failing to generate hope. Punjab needs a ten-year reconstruction plan covering debt management, industry, border districts, small enterprises, agricultural research, assured markets for diversification, water management and, above all, employment for its youth.
The BJP has both an advantage and a burden. It governs at the Centre, but cannot pretend that every problem begins and ends in Chandigarh. Tackling drugs requires state police, central agencies and border management to work together. Agricultural diversification depends on national procurement, trade, ethanol and pricing policies. The much-touted “double-engine” model will matter only if it produces measurable outcomes on the ground.
On Chandigarh, river waters, the BBMB and the Bandi Singhs, the BJP cannot rely on ambiguity. As the ruling party at the Centre, it will be asked for answers, not sympathy. It must demonstrate that national integration and Punjab’s rights are not competing ideas.
The deepest obstacle may be the trust deficit among farmers and much of rural Sikh society following the farm-law agitation. Sikh appointments may help, but symbolism cannot substitute for policy. The BJP must clearly explain its position on MSP, agricultural markets, farm debt, diversification, groundwater and farm incomes.
The party also faces a strategic choice over the SAD. Contesting alone may serve its long-term expansion; an alliance could improve its short-term electoral arithmetic. But the votes of two weakened parties cannot simply be added together, particularly when vote transferability is uncertain and Waris Punjab De is reshaping the Panthic political space.
The appointments show that the BJP high command has begun to take Punjab seriously. Whether Punjab takes the BJP equally seriously will depend on what follows.
If the BJP treats 19 per cent as an entitlement, even 8 per cent is possible. If it treats 19 per cent as a starting point, repairs its organisation, respects Punjab’s federal concerns and offers a credible route out of economic decline, it can expand beyond expectations.
That is because a significant section of Punjab’s electorate is not merely looking for another political party. It is looking for an alternative that can restore confidence in the state’s economic future—and the BJP now has an opportunity to make that case.
The author Gurpartap Singh Mann is a former Member of the Punjab Public Service Commission and former Chief General Manager of the Punjab Infrastructure Development Board.
