Soldiers stand guard at Attari-Wagah border.
By Riyaz Wani
For much of the past decade, India-Pakistan relations have been defined by military crises, diplomatic freezes and uncompromising public rhetoric. Since the Pulwama attack in 2019, the revocation of Article 370, the collapse of formal bilateral engagement and, more recently, the Pahalgam terror attack and Operation Sindoor in 2025, dialogue has virtually disappeared from the vocabulary of official diplomacy.
Yet, over the past few months, a series of developments has reopened a debate that many believed had been settled. Civil society initiatives, unofficial Track-II meetings, statements from influential voices within India’s strategic establishment and renewed calls from political leaders in Jammu and Kashmir have raised an intriguing question: while New Delhi publicly insists that nothing has changed, is the political ecosystem quietly preparing the ground for future engagement with Pakistan?
The answer remains uncertain. What is becoming increasingly evident, however, is that the conversation about dialogue has returned, even if official policy has not.
The trigger for the latest debate was not an announcement from either government but a growing chorus of unofficial initiatives. A joint appeal signed by 117 citizens from India and Pakistan, including former Jammu and Kashmir chief ministers Farooq Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti, urged both countries to restore bilateral dialogue, restart discussions on Jammu and Kashmir and take incremental steps towards de-escalation.
The appeal argued that “India and Pakistan together are home to nearly one-fifth of humanity. A large portion of our population is young. Continued hostility deprives millions of young people of opportunities, prosperity and a secure future.”
Ordinarily, such declarations by peace activists attract limited attention. This time, however, they coincided with unofficial meetings between retired diplomats, military officers and strategic experts from both countries in Colombo under the umbrella of a regional security conference. Although New Delhi dismissed these interactions as private events, their timing fuelled speculation that unofficial channels were once again becoming active.
Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri was unequivocal in distancing the government from the Colombo meeting. “I have seen the reports. I am aware of them. Dozens of these kinds of events take place in dozens of places around the world on a whole variety of subjects. So there is nothing new, nothing special about these events.”
He further clarified that they were “private events organised by private parties” and stressed that “there is nothing official about them as far as we are concerned.”
The official denial reflected India’s long-standing position that Track-II diplomacy cannot substitute formal state policy. Yet diplomacy often unfolds in layers. Throughout the history of India-Pakistan relations—from the backchannel negotiations under Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf to the quiet contacts preceding later confidence-building measures—unofficial conversations have frequently preceded official engagement.
What makes the current moment different is that the strongest calls for dialogue are no longer emerging solely from traditional peace activists. They are increasingly coming from voices that are difficult to dismiss as politically naïve.
Perhaps the most consequential intervention came from Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) general secretary Dattatreya Hosabale, who remarked, “We should not close the doors. We should always be ready to engage in dialogue.”
Although Hosabale does not formulate government policy, the RSS remains the ideological fountainhead of the Bharatiya Janata Party. His statement immediately attracted attention because it appeared to soften the political narrative that has dominated India-Pakistan relations for years.
The significance of the remark lay less in its content than in its source. Calls for dialogue from opposition parties or Kashmiri leaders have long been dismissed by critics as predictable. A similar suggestion from one of the BJP’s principal ideological voices inevitably carries greater political weight.
Former Army Chief General M.M. Naravane’s public support for dialogue added another dimension. His endorsement reinforced the view held by many retired security officials that communication between adversaries remains essential even during periods of confrontation.
Political leaders in Jammu and Kashmir quickly welcomed these developments.
Chief Minister Omar Abdullah argued that dialogue should never become politically controversial. “There is nothing new. The tensions have existed for the last 30-40 years. Recently, RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat also said that India and Pakistan should talk to each other and establish friendly ties. No one objects when the RSS says this, yet an uproar ensues when leaders from Jammu and Kashmir speak of it.”
His observation highlighted an enduring feature of India’s Pakistan debate: identical arguments often receive different political treatment depending on who makes them.
Peoples Democratic Party president Mehbooba Mufti viewed the unofficial contacts as an opportunity to reimagine Kashmir’s strategic role.
“Kashmir can become the gateway to peace and prosperity for both India and Pakistan. Geographically, Kashmir is strategically located and has old trade links to Central Asia. Both countries can use Kashmir as a bridge for peace instead of a bone of contention.”
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq similarly endorsed the citizens’ initiative, describing such efforts as vital in the absence of formal diplomacy.
“At a time when official engagement remains limited, such civil society initiatives are important because they keep alive the hope for peace, dignity, connectivity, and a future free from hostility.”
These voices collectively reflect a sentiment that remains strong within sections of Jammu and Kashmir—that prolonged diplomatic paralysis imposes its greatest costs on border communities, divided families, traders and ordinary citizens rather than governments alone.
However, the renewed discussion about dialogue cannot be understood solely through the prism of Kashmir. It is equally a product of changing regional geopolitics.
Since the four-day military confrontation of May 2025, the strategic environment has evolved considerably. Pakistan has attempted to reposition itself diplomatically through its engagement in West Asian diplomacy, while India’s relations with several Western partners have become more complicated due to trade disputes and broader geopolitical recalibrations. These changes have encouraged analysts to ask whether both countries might eventually find renewed engagement strategically useful, even if political conditions remain unfavourable.
Yet none of this alters the central obstacle that has frozen bilateral relations for years: terrorism, which India perrennially blames Pakistan for and Pakistan, in turn, levels similar allegations at India.
It also explains why New Delhi has shown no indication of altering its official position despite the renewed chatter around dialogue. Since the 2025 Pahalgam attack, which killed 25 tourists and one Kashmiri pony handler, India has hardened its policy, placing the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance and declaring that bilateral engagement cannot resume unless Pakistan irrevocably ends cross-border terrorism. The Modi government’s formulation has remained unchanged: “talks and terror cannot go together.”
That position has become more than a diplomatic slogan. It now serves as the organising principle of India’s Pakistan policy.
Following Operation Sindoor, Prime Minister Narendra Modi described India’s response as establishing a “new normal,” signalling that future terrorist attacks would invite direct military retaliation rather than prolonged diplomatic protest. In this framework, dialogue is no longer viewed as a confidence-building measure but as a possible reward for demonstrable changes in Pakistan’s behaviour.
For Pakistan, however, dialogue remains an immediate strategic objective. Islamabad has repeatedly called for restoration of diplomatic engagement, reopening of trade and revival of the Indus Waters Treaty. Pakistani officials have also projected recent unofficial meetings as evidence that communication channels remain alive despite political hostility.
This divergence illustrates the fundamental asymmetry between the two countries. Pakistan seeks engagement as a starting point; India increasingly views it as an end point that can only follow sustained action against terrorism.
Interestingly, one of the participants at the Colombo conference, BJP leader and India Foundation president Ram Madhav, later dismissed suggestions that it represented Track-II diplomacy. Writing after the controversy, he argued that the conference had been mischaracterised and insisted that India had not altered its position.
He maintained that “there is no Track 2 diplomacy with Pakistan” and argued that conferences involving retired officials and academics should not be confused with structured diplomatic initiatives that enjoy tacit government approval.
More importantly, Ram Madhav defended the government’s refusal to reopen engagement by recalling earlier attempts at reconciliation.
“Prime minister Narendra Modi broke India’s 6 year freeze by inviting his Pakistan counterpart, Nawaz Sheriff for the oath-taking ceremony in 2014. He made a path-breaking impromptu visit to Lahore a year later, extending an olive branch of friendship. But the recalcitrant neighbour misread the importance of those gestures and returned to its old habit by offering Uri and Pulwama terrorist attacks in succession in return.”
Yet history also suggests that India-Pakistan diplomacy has rarely progressed in a straight line. Periods of intense hostility have often been followed by unexpected engagement. The Lahore Declaration came less than a year before the Kargil conflict. The Composite Dialogue resumed after years of confrontation. Even after the Mumbai attacks, backchannel contacts continued intermittently despite public acrimony.
This cyclical pattern explains why analysts remain cautious about dismissing the current developments entirely.
